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The Impeachment
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CRITICISM OF PUBLIC MEN
Mr. Sumners resolutions upon the subject of impeachment and the
public judgment upon it will probably pass, if pressed to a vote. The Senators who voted
to convict will probably support them, and the others will not agree to them. Those who
called the Republican Senators who voted for acquittal "infamous" will still
think them so; and those who differed will remain of the same opinion. We can not see that
anything will be gained by the passage of the resolutions; except possibly the clearer
perception that when there is so vital a difference of opinion as to the nature of
impeachment, the process is not likely to be very beneficial to the country. The point of
Mr. Sumners resolutions is, that "Senators can not claim that their votes are
exempt from the judgment of the people." This is the declaration made also by many
newspapers, some in a reasonable tone, and some in a very different one. But what Senator
has claimed such immunity, and what sensible man has demanded it for him?If the character of a public man
is so profligate, and his conduct so generally corrupt as to authorize the suspicion that
his vote has been bought or improperly influenced, it is perfectly fair to say so,
provided that the charge be supported by a reference to notorious precedents and to
universal reputation. But to assume that a mans conduct is corrupt because motives
may be imagined that might possibly make it so is an unspeakable wrong. Criticism of
public men is desirable and inevitable. But what is criticism? If a man thinks that an
oath to decide in a specific case according to the evidence is an oath to be bound,
despite his conviction, by party dictationvery well. That is his opinion. We will
not quarrel, but we will, I hope, argue. But for such a man to say that another who
believes that his oath means exactly what it says, and who acts accordingly, is
"infamous," and a Judas, a Benedict Arnold, and a Jefferson Davis because he
declines to yield to the party dictation, seems to us a blow at freedom itself. It is an
effort to check liberty of thought, and destroy liberty of speech by terrorism.
Surely it is not a fair criticism of the
motives of a public man who casts a vote differently from the wishes of many of his party
friends to allege that he is governed by nothing but passion and chagrin, and to denounce
him as a renegade. The St. Louis Democrat says that "If Senator Fessenden was
under obligation to vote as his conscience dictated, so every honest and patriotic man in
the land is under obligation to approve or disapprove as his conscience may dictate."
Undoubtedly. The honest and patriotic man may indeed differ with the judgment of his
Senator, and say so; but can an honest conscience possibly disapprove the Senators
voting according to his conviction? The case stated by the Democrat can not exist.
No honest man will disapprove an honest vote, whether he agrees with it or not. The Democrat
further says that a Senator is as much a public servant when sitting in a trial for
impeachment as when deliberating and voting upon a bill. But in the case of impeachment he
is a public servant only as a judge is. Like the judge he is sworn to see that justice is
done according to the law and evidence, not that what he conceives to be the public
opinion upon the case is ratified. The very sanctity of the bench is that it is a refuge
against a possible unjust public opinion; that it is the tribunal of reason and facts, not
of passion and ignorance. When Mr. Hoar went to Charleston to test the legal validity of
certain acts in the courts, the public opinion of slavery would not permit him to tarry.
But if he had been suffered to remain, and the same opinion, however universal, had
overpowered the court, no other proof would have been needed of the sheer barbarism of
that society. So when a certain verdict was demanded of the Senate sitting as a court
sworn to decide by the evidence, and demanded not by argument and reason, but by threats
and epithets and abuse, those who demanded the verdict did what James did when he required
that judgment should be given according to his will. Coke made his memorable reply that he
should do that which should be fit for a judge to do. It seems to us that every Senator
sworn to decide according to the evidence was as solemnly bound not to be influenced by
party opinion as Coke was to be independent of the Kings will.
If, however, the trial was not a judicial
proceeding; if the Senators represented merely the wishes of a party, their path was
plain, and the process of impeachment is ridiculous. But this theory is utterly untenable.
The President is impeachable for high crimes and misdemeanors. His offenses are
specifically alleged. The proof of them, with the rebutting evidence, is presented. The
arguments upon both sides are made. The Senators are shown to decide according to the
evidence whether he has committed the offenses charged. If this is not a court, there is
no such thing as a court. If impeachment be, as the resolutions of Mr. Sumner assert,
purely a political proceeding, can there be any good reason given why the Constitution did
not provide that when two-thirds of the Senate think that the public welfare requires the
removal of the President, he may be removed? If he is to be removed for violating a law,
or his oath, or for any misconduct, certainly he ought not to be so until the offense has
been plainly proved. If he is to be removed because he is politically obnoxious, it is
surely absurd to arraign him upon charges of specific offenses, and to swear the Senators
to decide according to the evidence when their duty is to remove him, not after proof of
charges, but whenever they think he ought to be set aside. If he may be removed for what
Mr. Sumner calls a political offense, then his theory is, that the President may be
removed because he differs with the Senate.
This is an intolerable doctrine.
Undoubtedly the Executive authority is, under certain circumstances, subordinated to the
Legislative. But the chief magistrate is to be set aside only upon proved specific
charges, not for a difference of opinion. Therefore we have always insisted that
obstructive as President Johnson unquestionably was, he should not be impeached until he
had violated a law, or committed some offense other than pursuing his hostile course
within the limits of the Constitution. In removing Mr. Stanton it seemed to us, and still
seems, that he violated the law, and we think he should have been removed. But when those
who agreed with us attempted to intimidate his judges we felt, and still feel, that their
offense was infinitely greater than any charged upon him. We do not agree that that
intimidation was honorable argument. It was the ferocity of party-spirit, and the
subsequent criticism, as it is called, of the Republican Senators who differed, which
consisted in asserting or insinuating that their verdict did not express their real
conviction but was the result of personal jealousy, or bribery, seems to us to spring from
the same party-spirit. If the motives of those who are elected to the bench, as Senators
are in an impeachment trial, are to be venomously assailed if they do not judge
politically instead of judicially, then one of the most vital safeguards of society, the
independence of the Judiciary, is in immediate danger. The resolutions speak of the Dred
Scott decision. But the objection to that decision was its obiter dictum; its
declaration beyond the issue, and beyond the truth of history; and the palpable monstrous
effort to strain the law and the fact against humanity and justice. To show this was
fairly to criticize the decision. Any one who can show a similar attempt upon the part of
any Republican Senator in the late trial, or can prove it to be probable from his
antecedents and reputation is bound to do it. But a bald aspersion of motives, a screaming
vituperation, is not criticism.
Articles Related to the Impeachment, Trial, and
Acquittal:
To see a list of the related
articles go back to the intro
section. |
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