There can be little question that upon all points susceptible of
proof by evidence the Managers have justified their articles; and it was illustrative of
the peculiar tact of General Butler that he reserved to the last one of his strongest
points, and somewhat surprised and annoyed his antagonists when he produced it. This was
the testimony of Mr. Creecy, Appointment-Clerk of the Treasury Department, and the
autograph letter of the President to Secretary MCulloch last August, notifying him
that he had suspended Mr. Stanton in pursuance of the Tenure-of-Office Act, thereby
shaming his own assertion that he had acted "Under the Constitution," and
without recognizing the law in question. Indeed, General Butler has unquestionably had the
best of the weeks work. Only one serious effort of his has been baffled by the
Presidents counsel; and Mr. Evartss occasional caustic manner has not in the
least disturbed the vast imperturbability of the practical advocate.
The case for the Managers,
notwithstanding the array of articles, was really very simple. The most of it is of course
already familiar, for all the transactions have been public. That there is a
Tenure-of-Office law prescribing the conditions under which certain officers, including
the Secretary of War, are to be removed, is not denied. That Mr. Stanton was peremptorily
removed by the President during the session of the Senate is in evidence. That General
Thomas, having been previously reinstated by the President as Adjutant-General, was
appointed by him Secretary of War ad interim is proved. That General Thomas signed
himself as such, and attempted to exercise the duties of the office; that he declared his
intention to obtain possession by force if resisted, and that he stated his failure to do
so was in consequence of the legal action of Mr. Stanton, is also proved. It is
established further that the President officially acknowledged the validity of the law by
confessedly acting under its authority, while he declared that he did not recognize it as
binding; that in September, after the suspension of Mr. Stanton last summer, the President
called General Emory to the command of the Department of the District, and upon his
arrival to assume command had a detailed conversation in regard to the available military
force there; that upon the day of the attempted removal of Mr. Stanton the President sent
for General Emory and asked him again about the troops and what changes had been made;
that when the General proceeded to explain the movements of regiments the President said
he referred to other changes made within a day or two, to which the General replied that
he knew of none, and that as all orders must by law pass through the hands of General
Grant, if any new ones had been issued, he should of course be aware of them; that the
President seemed surprised, and when the General showed him the order directing all orders
for the army to pass through General Grant, the President said it was in derogation of his
constitutional rights as Commander-in-Chief, to which General Emory replied that the
officers of the army were of opinion that it was their duty to obey the order, which was
in obedience to the law of Congress. It is further proved that the expressions ascribed to
the President in the speeches during his Western trip were actually used by him.
The attempt of the Managers to show, in
further proof of conspiracy, by the testimony of Mr. Chandler, that Mr. Edmund Cooper,
late Private Secretary of the President, was made by him Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury in order that the money of the Government might be obtained by the President for
his purposes, was overruled by the Senate; the ground of its action being understood to be
that the evidence would open too wide and irrelevant a range of inquiry. This was the only
apparently important point not made by the Managers, and this was not essential. They
closed the case promptly at the end of the first week, and the Senate then adjourned until
the following Thursday to give the Presidents counsel an opportunity to prepare
themselves fully, with the understanding that they will not call a great many witnesses.
The case is thus brought to the exact
point which we have before indicated as the one upon which the force of the
Presidents counsel was most likely to be concentrated. Conceding the facts claimed
and substantially proved, that the law was regularly enacted, and that it forbade the
removal during the session of the Senate of certain officers appointed by the President
without the approval of the Senate; conceding that Mr. Stanton was Secretary of War, and
was removed by the President without the consent of the Senatethen the question
arises, was Mr. Stanton appointed Secretary of War by President Johnson? If he were, the
law has been violated. If he were not, the law does not touch the case. The position taken
by the Managers is revealed by a little remark of Mr. Wilson when he offered the first
evidence for the prosecution. After putting in the commission of Mr. Stanton, signed by
President Lincoln, Mr. Wilson said that it was the only commission the Managers proposed
to prove, and that commission, in the judgment of the Managers, made Mr. Stanton Secretary
of War. The battle will be joined just at this point. We will not anticipate the
arguments, but the rule of common sense is plainly with the Managers. If a man holds an
appointed office and the appointing power is changed, but the new power directs him to
remain, it seems to be tolerably clear that he is reappointed. This is a subject, however,
upon which there may be the utmost refinement of legal subtlety, of which we shall
doubtless have a notable exhibition.
Should the appointment of Mr. Stanton as
Secretary be maintained by the Managers, and he be judged to stand within the operation of
the law, it is possible that the Presidents counsel may try to show that there was
no improper intention in its violation by the President. We doubt if the utmost skill can
do this, for it is impossible to destroy the evidence that he had already recognized its
validity. And even could it be doneeven were it conceded that he had always refused
to acknowledge the constitutionality of the law, yet the violation by the Executive of a
law regularly enacted and not declared invalid by any court, is the substitution of the
Presidents will for the law of the land, and the intention must be inferred from the
fact. The President is not charged with what is generally called a crime, but with a high
misdemeanor in the discharge of political functions. Should he be removed, he will not
subsequently be pursued with a criminal prosecution, as the Constitution authorizes when a
crime otherwise punishable has been committed. Indeed the case is very simple, and
addresses itself to the common-sense of the whole country. Mr. Seward had already asked
the people of the United States whether they would have Mr. Johnson for king; and we
presume that the Senate will answer in their name"Decidedly not."